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Abstract
Broadcast authentication is a fundamental security service in wireless sen-
sor networks (WSNs). Although symmetric-key-based µTESLA-like schemes
were employed due to their energy efficiency, they all suffer from DoS attacks
resulting from the nature of delayed message authentication. Recently, sev-
eral public-key-based schemes were proposed to achieve immediate broadcast
authentication that may significantly improved security strength. However,
while the public-key-based schemes obviate the security vulnerability inher-
ent to symmetric-key-based µTESLA-like schemes, their signature verifica-
tion is time-consuming. Thus, speeding up signature verification is a problem
of considerable practical importance, especially in resource-constrained en-
vironments. This paper exploits the cooperation among sensor nodes to ac-
celerate the signature verification of vBNN-IBS, a pairing-free identity-based
signature with reduced signature size. We demonstrate through on exten-
sive performance evaluation study that the accelerated vBNN-IBS achieves
the longest network lifetime compared to both the traditional vBNN-IBS and
the accelerated ECDSA schemes. The accelerated vBNN-IBS runs 66% faster
than the traditional signature verification method. Results from theoretical
analysis, simulation, and real-world experimentation on a MICAz platform
are provided to validate our claims.
Keywords: Broadcast authentication, ID-based cryptography, Digital
signature, Accelerated verification, Wireless sensor networks
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1. Introduction
In wireless sensor networks, message broadcast is an efficient and a com-
mon communication paradigm that allows a multitude of users to join in and
disseminate messages into the network dynamically in order to obtain infor-
mation of their interest. Unfortunately, sensor networks are very susceptible
for attacks. Due to the nature of wireless communication in sensor networks,
adversaries can easily eavesdrop on the traffic, inject bogus data messages or
alter the contents of legitimate messages during multihop forwarding. Hence,
authentication mechanisms must be provided to ensure that communication
at all times is performed between the correct entities.
When the issue of broadcast authentication first appeared, symmetric
key cryptography-based µTESLA-like schemes [1, 2] were employed due to
their energy efficiency. µTESLA-like schemes provide source authentication
and message integrity by using one-way hash chains and delayed disclosure
of authentication keys. By using Message Authentication Code (MAC) and
one-way hash functions, µTESLA is able to take low computation effort to
broadcast. Nevertheless, the µTESLA induces cache delays for broadcast
packets which could be exploited by an attacker to launch DoS attacks [3].
The lack of immediate authentication makes µ-TESLA and its variations
unsuitable for applications with real-time requirements. In addition, they
also require some level of synchronization between all nodes in the network
which must be achieved by periodic broadcasting [4]. All these shortcomings
make such schemes unsuitable for broadcast authentication.
Public key cryptography (PKC), on the other hand, is desirable for broad-
cast authentication. Employing PKC for implementing broadcast authentica-
tion in WSNs provides simple solutions, strong security resilience, good scala-
bility and immediate message authentication, when compared to symmetric-
key based solutions [5]. Although there is a prejudice against the feasibility
of PKC in WSN, recent studies [6, 7] have reported that PKC is possi-
ble in WSNs. For instance, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) signature
verification takes 1.61s, with 160-bit keys on an ATmega128 8-MHz proces-
sor [6]. Thus, several PKC-based broadcast authentication protocols have
been proposed [8, 7, 9, 10]. These protocols are based on several crypto-
graphic techniques, including Merkle Hash Tree [11], public-key ECC-based
signature scheme such as ECDSA [12], and ID-based signature scheme [13]
with either pairing-free or optimal-pairing. While the PKC-based schemes
avoid the security vulnerability intrinsic to µTESLA-like schemes, the rela-
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tively slow signature verification in public-key cryptosystems causes high en-
ergy consumption and long verification delay for broadcast authentication in
WSNs. Thus, speeding up signature verification is a problem of considerable
practical importance, especially in resource-constrained environments. Fan
and Gong [5] proposed a method to accelerate ECDSA signature verification
in WSNs by exploiting the cooperation among sensor nodes. The speedup
results from each node probabilistically forwarding a partially-calculated sig-
nature to its neighbors. Then many sensor nodes can use the received inter-
mediate computation results to accelerate their signature verifications. Un-
like public-key ECC-based authenticated systems, ID-based authenticated
systems do not require the transmission of public-key certificates which re-
duces the certificate overhead and improves computational efficiency. This
makes them especially attractive for use in WSNs. However, the verification
of ID-based signatures is still slow and computationally expensive for WSNs.
Inspired by the acceleration technique of Fan and Gong [5], we propose
in this paper an accelerated verification of digital signatures generated by
vBNN-IBS [9], a pairing-free identity-based signature with reduced signature
size. However, unlike the original technique and in order to harden the
attacker’s task, the proposed technique releases the sum of two intermediate
computation results rather than releasing them separately. By doing so, it
becomes more difficult for an attacker to forge the two intermediate results. It
also allows to reduce the message overhead while more intermediate results
are released. Another important contribution of our work consists in the
extensive performance evaluation through theoretical, simulation and real-
world experimental studies. Through this evaluation, we:
• carefully chose the optimization methods used for a scalar point mul-
tiplication based on ensuring a satisfactory compromise between the
execution time and the required memory size.
• emphasized the impact of energy consumed by the different node’s
states on the protocol performances; something that was neglected in
similar works. We found out that node’s states constitutes an impor-
tant fraction (more than 92%) of the total energy dissipated within
the network. Therefore, neglecting this important fraction can lead to
erroneous conclusions about the protocol performances.
• demonstrated that the scheme’s performances are not only affected by
the number of nodes releasing intermediate results, but also by the
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deployment topology of nodes and the diffusion pattern followed to
broadcast the user packet in the entire network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we give a brief
introduction to elliptic curve cryptography and vBNN-IBS [9]. Section 4
describes the proposed acceleration technique for signature verification in
WSNs. In Section 5, we improve the scheme and we discuss the selection of
system parameters. The security strengths of the proposed scheme are dis-
cussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents theoretical, simulation, and real-world
experimentation performance results that demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed acceleration technique. The impact of the network topology on
the performance achieved is assessed in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 outlines
our concluding remarks and future work directions.
2. Related Work
When the issue of broadcast authentication first appeared, symmetric key
cryptography-based µTESLA-like schemes [1, 2, 14] were employed due to
their energy efficiency. µTESLA-like schemes provide source authentication
and message integrity by using one-way hash chains and delayed disclosure
of authentication keys. µTESLA [1] is an extension of the TESLA [15] au-
thentication scheme adapted for WSNs to reduce the computation overhead.
The µTESLA scheme employs a chain of authentication keys linked to each
other by a one-way hash function; each key in the chain is the hash value of
the next key computed using the one-way hash function. The first key of the
chain, called the key-chain commitment, is securely sent to all the receiving
nodes. A sender broadcasts a packet along with a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) generated using the current key from the one-way chain, that
key will be disclosed after a pre-defined period of time. Upon receiving this
packet, each receiver checks if the packet was sent before the disclosure of the
key used to calculate the attached MAC. If so, the receiver buffers the packet
which will be authenticated when the corresponding disclosed key is received.
µTESLA faces a scalability problem because the key-chain commitment has
to be unicasted to each node which incurs high communication overhead lim-
iting the network scale. Moreover, the key chain length is limited, and thus
cannot support broadcast for a long time.
To address the two aforementioned problems, the multi-level µTESLA [2]
technique was proposed. The unicast-based distribution of key chain com-
mitments is bypassed by predetermining and broadcasting the commitments.
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To extend the lifetime of authenticated broadcast without requiring a very
long key chain, a multi-level key chains are used. The keys in the lowest level
key chains are used for authenticating data packets and usually lasts for a
relatively short period. Each higher-level key chain is used to distribute the
commitments of the immediately lower-level key chains. However, multi-level
µTESLA scheme as well as the original µTESLA protocol are not scalable in
terms of the number of senders. Subsequently, the tree-based µTESLA [14]
scheme was proposed to support a large number of senders over a long period
of time by using Merkle hash tree [11]. The basic idea consists first in defining
multiple µTESLA instances which may be used by different senders during
different periods of time. Then, a Merkle hash tree is built to authenticate
and distribute the initial parameters (i.e., the key chain commitment, start-
ing time, duration of each µTESLA interval, etc.) for µTESLA instances.
The i-th leaf corresponds to the hash value of the initial parameters for the
i-th µTESLA instances. Unfortunately, the tree-based µTESLA scheme sup-
ports the multisender scenario at the cost of higher communication overhead
per message, limiting thus the number of senders.
By using MAC codes and one-way hash functions, µTESLA-like schemes
are able to take low computation effort to broadcast. Nevertheless, those
schemes induce cache delays for broadcast packets which could be exploited
by an attacker to launch DoS attacks [3]. The lack of immediate authen-
tication makes µTESLA and its variations unsuitable for applications with
real-time requirements. In addition, they also require some level of synchro-
nization between all nodes in the network which must be achieved by periodic
broadcasting [4]. All these shortcomings make such schemes unsuitable for
broadcast authentication.
Schemes proposed in [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] are based on one-time signa-
ture mechanism. Those schemes are computationally efficient as signatures
only rely on one-way functions without trapdoors. However, some of these
schemes require large storage space and produce large signatures leading
to high communication overhead. Furthermore, the security level of such
schemes depends on the collision resistant of the one-way function used.
Indeed, the security strength is inversely proportional to the number of sig-
natures generated.
Public key cryptography (PKC), on the other hand, is desirable for broad-
cast authentication. Employing PKC for implementing broadcast authentica-
tion in WSNs provides simple solutions, strong security resilience, good scala-
bility and immediate message authentication, when compared to symmetric-
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key based solutions [5]. Although there is a prejudice against the feasibility
of PKC in WSN, recent studies [6, 7] have reported that PKC is possible in
WSNs. Thus, several PKC-based broadcast authentication protocols have
been proposed [7, 8, 9, 10].
A straightforward authentication scheme based on certificate was pro-
posed in [7]. The scheme is inefficient in terms of communication and com-
putation costs. A certificate has to be transmitted along with each signature
which induces a larger per-message overhead. Moreover, extra computa-
tion operations are needed to validate the received certificate; the certifi-
cate validation is equal to a signature verification. Consequently, the energy
consumption during the communication and computational processes is in-
creased. Another concern with this scheme consists in its inefficiency to
support user revocation, because the certificate revocation list stored in each
sensor node requires a storage space linear to the total number of revoked
certificates. To avoid the storage overhead of the certificate-based scheme,
a Merkle hash tree-based authentication scheme [7] was proposed. In this
scheme, a Merkle hash tree with leaves corresponding to the current users
is constructed. Each leaf of the Merkle tree contains the binding between
the corresponding user ID and his public key. With only the hash value
of the root node of the hash tree stored on each sensor node, a revoked or
an invalid user public key can never pass the verification. Nevertheless, the
Merkle hash tree-based scheme is communication inefficient when the number
of users becomes large. This is because the size of AAI (Auxiliary Authen-
tication Information) grows logarithmically with the number of users. This
scheme was improved by increasing the number of stored hash values on sen-
sor nodes in order to reduce the size of AAI [7]. Although this improvement
decreases the communication cost, it increases in parallel the storage cost.
Ren et al. [8] proposed a multi-user broadcast authentication scheme called
HAS. To reduce the computational and communication costs while increas-
ing the number of users, HAS uses several cryptographic building blocks,
such as the Bloom filter [21], a variant of ECDSA with the partial message
recovery [22], and the Merkle tree [11]. Nevertheless, HAS does not support
user scalability due to the use of Merkle hash tree; a new user can be added
to WSN only after the revocation of an old one.
ID-based authentication schemes [7, 9, 10] have recently attracted sub-
stantial attention due to their communication efficiency and support of scal-
ability. The authors in [7] proposed a broadcast authentication scheme using
ID-based signatures [23]. This scheme decreases the communication overhead
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as it removes the need of certification transmission and provide sound scal-
ability. However, it incurs a very high computational overhead as is based
on the costly bilinear pairing operations. Cao et al. [9] proposed IMBAS,
a more efficient ID-based multi-user broadcast authentication scheme based
on a variant of the pairing-free ID-based signature scheme BNN-IBS [24]
with reduced signature size. IMBAS achieves better scalability and lower
energy consumption compared to scheme in [7]. The EIBAS scheme pre-
sented in [10] uses a pairing-optimal identity-based signature scheme with
message recovery, where the original message of the signature is not required
to be transmitted. The EIBAS scheme requires the shortest broadcast mes-
sage size compared to the two aforementioned ID-based schemes. However,
EIBAS still relies on bilinear pairing operations which are computationally
expensive.
While the PKC-based schemes avoid the security vulnerability intrinsic to
µTESLA-like schemes, the relatively slow signature verification in public-key
cryptosystems causes high energy consumption and long verification delay for
broadcast authentication in WSNs. Thus, speeding up signature verification
is a problem of considerable practical importance, especially in resource-
constrained environments. Fan and Gong [5] proposed a method to accel-
erate ECDSA signature verification in WSNs by exploiting the cooperation
among sensor nodes. The speedup results from each node probabilistically
forwarding a partially-calculated signature to its neighbors. Then many sen-
sor nodes can use the received intermediate computation results to acceler-
ate their signature verifications. Unlike public-key ECC-based authenticated
systems, ID-based authenticated systems do not require the transmission of
public-key certificates which reduces the certificate overhead and improves
computational efficiency. This makes them especially attractive for use in
WSNs. However, the verification of ID-based signatures is still slow and
computationally expensive for WSNs.
Inspired by the acceleration technique of Fan and Gong [5], we propose
in this paper an accelerated verification of digital signatures generated by
vBNN-IBS [9]. As mentioned above, vBNN-IBS is a variant of Bellare Nam-
prempre Neven Identity-Based Signature (BNN-IBS) scheme [24].
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to elliptic curve cryp-
tography, followed by a variant of ID-based signature scheme with reduced
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signature vBNN-IBS [9].
3.1. Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are typically defined over a prime
finite field Fq, where q is a large prime number. It is defined by a cubic
equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (1)
with a, b ∈ Fq are constants such that 4a3 + 27b3 6≡ 0 [25]. An elliptic
curve E over Fq consists of the set of all pairs of coordinates (x, y) that satisfy
the equation (1) along with a point at infinity O.
E(Fq) = (x, y) ∈ Fq ∗ Fq where y2 = x3 + ax+ b ∪ O (2)
P ∈ E(Fq) is a point of order p and G is a group generated by P . Note
that p is a prime number with p2 does not divide the order of E(Fq). G
forms a cyclic group under the point addition “ + ” defined as follows: Let
P , Q ∈ E(Fq), l be the line containing P and Q (tangent line to E(Fq) if
P = Q), and R, the third point of intersection of l with E(Fq). Let l′ be the
line connecting R and O. Then P“ + ”Q is the point such that l′ intersects
E(Fq) at R, O and P“+”Q. Point multiplication over E/Fq can be computed
as follows: nP = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
The problem of finding n given nP and P is called the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). It is computationally infeasible to
solve ECDLP for appropriate parameters [25]. The hardness of ECDLP
allows several cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves.
3.2. vBNN-IBS signature scheme
vBNN-IBS [9] is a pairing-free ID-based signature scheme with reduced
signature size, for securing users’ broadcasts in wireless sensor networks.
vBNN-IBS [9] is an ID-based cryptosystem, where a user’s public key is
directly derivable from his/her publicly known identity information, and the
user’s private key is calculated by a trusted party, called PKG (Private Key
Generator). A user’s identifier serves as the user’s public key, and the user’s
private key is the user’s public key certificate. vBNN-IBS is implemented as
follows:
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Setup Given the security parameter k, PKG takes the following steps:
1. Specify E/Fq and a point P of order p.
2. Select a system secret key x at random from Zp and set the system
public key P0 = xP .
3. Choose two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}×G∗1 −→ Zp
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Zp.
4. Publish system parameters (E/Fq, P, p, P0, H1, H2) and keep x se-
cret.
User-Key Extraction Given a user A’s unique identifier IDA ∈ {0, 1}∗,
PKG generates A’s private key PriA based on Schnorr signature [11]
as follows:
1. Choose at random r ∈ Zp and compute R = rP .
2. Use system secret key x to compute s = r + cx, where c =
H1(IDA||R).
A’s private key is the pair (R, s), and is sent to A by PKG through a
secure channel.
Signature Generation User A with identifier IDA signs a message m with
its private key PriA = (R, s) as follows:
1. Choose at random y ∈ Zp and compute Y = yP .
2. Compute h = H2(IDA,m,R, Y ) and z = y + hs.
The tuple (R, h, z) is A’s signature on m.
Signature Verification Given (R, h, z) signature, IDA and message m, a
verifier first computes c = H1(IDA||R). Then it checks whether the
equation: h = H2(IDA,m,R, zP − h(R + cP0)) holds. The signature
is accepted if it does and rejected otherwise.
3.3. Message broadcast and authentication
In [9], Cao et al. proposed that if a user with identifier ID wants to
broadcast a message M , it sends the following packet:
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< M, tt, ID, Sig{M, tt, ID} > (3)
where tt denotes the current time and Sig{M, tt, ID} is the user’s vBNN-
IBS signature over {M, tt, ID}.
Upon the receipt of packet 3, a sensor does the following:
1. Check whether tt is fresh.
2. Verify vBNN-IBS signature if tt is valid, drop the message otherwise.
3. Reject the message and drop it if the signature verification fails; prop-
agate the message to the next hop otherwise.
4. Faster vBNN-IBS signature verification
In the broadcast authentication procedure, as shown previously, all sen-
sor nodes execute the same signature verification after receiving a broad-
cast packet. To verify vBNN-IBS signature, each node needs to calculate
h = H2(IDA,m,R, zP − h(R + cP0)), then it must calculate zP , hR, and
hcP0. These three values are scalar multiplications over elliptic curve which
incur significant energy consumption. To reduce this cost, we propose an
accelerated variant of the vBNN-IBS signature verification which is inspired
by the acceleration technique of Fan et al. [5]. The key idea of this accelera-
tion technique comes from the observation that all sensor nodes execute the
same signature verification procedure during the broadcast authentication.
Therefore, some sensor nodes of the network will consume their energy to
release some intermediate information, as a result, the signature verification
of their neighbors can be accelerated significantly.
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Figure 1: Faster vBNN-IBS digital signature verification through nodes co-
operation
In Fig. 1, a user broadcast the packet < M, tt, ID, Sig{M, tt, ID} >,
where Sig{M, tt, ID} = (R, h, z) is the corresponding vBNN-IBS signature
of (M, tt, ID). When the nodes A, B and C receive the packet and finish the
signature verification successfully, they decide to release their intermediate
computation results l1P = zP , l2R = hR, and l3P0 = hcP0, respectively.
By this mean, nodes D and E, which are the neighbors of node A, can fast
verify the digital signature by performing two elliptic curve point multipli-
cations and two elliptic curve point additions zP − hR − hcP0, where hR
and hcP0 are computed by nodes D and E themselves and zP comes from
the contribution of node A. Moreover, nodes F , G, H, I can also perform
fast signature verification in a similar way. Hence, if some node in WSN
releases its intermediate computation result, all its neighbors can fast verify
the digital signature by just calculating two scalar multiplications and two
elliptic curve point additions (instead of three scalar multiplications), which
can improve performances by 33% as compared to the traditional vBNN-IBS
signature verification procedure.
Note that in our scheme, we can assume that each node that decides to
release its intermediate computation results, it sends two information among
the three information to its neighboring nodes, then it can send (l1P−l2R) =
(zP −hR), (l1P − l3P0) = (zP −hcP0) or (l2R+ l3P0) = (hR+hcP0). In this
case, our solution can achieve around 66% performance improvement over
the traditional vBNN-IBS signature verification procedure.
So, a question might arise: why not release the three intermediate compu-
tation results? In fact, the sensor nodes cannot use these three information
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(i.e. l1P , l2R, and l3P0) to fast verify the signature with two elliptic curve
point additions. The reason is that an adversary can capture a sensor node
A with identifier IDA and easily launch the following attack:
The adversary :
1. generates a bogus message m′.
2. randomly chooses, R′, l′1, l
′
2 and l
′
3.
3. computes l′1P − l′2R′ − l′3P0.
4. computes h′ = H2(IDA,m′, R′, l′1P − l′2R′ − l′3P0).
5. releases the signature (R′, h′, l′1) and the three additional informa-
tion l′1P , l
′
2R
′ and l′3P0.
The victim :
1. computes c′ = H1(IDA||R′).
2. From the three additional information released and the signature,
the victim calculates H2(IDA,m
′, R′, l′1P−l′2R′l′3P0) and compares
it with the received h′. As a result, the victim accept m′ as a valid
message.
To avoid the above attack, we only allow sensor nodes to use at most
two intermediate results among {l1P, l2R, l3P0} from their neighboring nodes
for signature verification. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that if some
sensor nodes release their intermediate computation results they will release
l2R and l3P0. Thus, if a sensor node decides to release its intermediate results,
it sends the following message:
{M, tt, ID, Sig{M, tt, ID}, (l2R + l3P0)} (4)
Where Sig{M, tt, ID} denotes the user’s vBNN-IBS signature over {M, tt, ID}.
LetMUL andADD denote the elliptic curve scalar multiplication and the
elliptic curve point addition, respectively. In our scheme, a sensor node may
receive a data packet {M, tt, ID, (R, h, z)} or {M, tt, ID, (R, h, z), l2R+l3P0}.
If a fresh packet {M, tt, ID, (R, h, z)} is received, the sensor node will first
compute l1P and then wait for a very short time period α to see whether it
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can obtain useful information from its neighbors for accelerating the signa-
ture verification. If it is, the node can finish the signature verification with
1MUL + 1ADD. Otherwise, the node will complete the verification itself
with 3MUL + 2ADD after the time period α. If the signature is verified
successfully, the sensor node will continue forwarding the broadcast package
to its neighbors. Otherwise, the sensor node will send a signed report to
the base station. Once the base station receives enough reports from the
network, it will perform appropriate security mechanisms to identify com-
promised nodes in WSN. Although the above basic scheme is simple and
efficient, it is still vulnerable to the following attack:
The adversary :
1. chooses randomly m′, z′, R′, Y ′, M ′ = {m′, tt, IDA}.
2. computes h′ = H2(IDA,M ′, R′, Y ′).
3. computes l′1P = z
′P .
4. computes Q = l′1P − Y ′.
5. uses (R′, h′, z′) as the signature of the message M ′ and releases
the bogus broadcast package {M ′, (R′, h′, z′), Q} to its neighbors.
The victim :
1. calculates c′ = H1(IDA||R′)
2. calculates l′1P = z
′P .
3. From the additional information released and the signature, the
victim calculates H2(IDA,M
′, R′, z′P −Q) and compares it with
the received h′. As a result, the victim accepts M ′ as a valid
message.
To cope with this attack, we adopt the idea in [5] to propose an enhanced
scheme as explained in the following paragraph. The enhanced scheme takes
advantage of the redundancy of broadcast packets in the WSN.
5. The enhanced scheme
In the enhanced scheme, each sensor node first waits for α seconds and
buffers β data packets (i.e., (R, h, z) or {(R, h, z), l2R+ l3P0}) received from
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its neighbors, where α and β are selected such that the sensor node can
receive at least one data packet from an honest neighbor. The sensor node
then checks whether the cached β data packets have identical (R, h, z) and
l2R + l3P0. If the sensor node finds that the received data packets have
different R, h, z or l2R + l3P0, it will report the potential attack to the
base station immediately. Otherwise, the sensor node checks whether it has
received useful data packets l2R+ l3P0 for accelerating signature verification.
If it is, it will calculate l1P and then complete the signature verification with
1MUL + 1ADD. Otherwise, the sensor node will perform the traditional
signature verification with 3MUL + 2ADD. The remaining steps after the
signature verification are the same as those in the basic scheme.
5.1. Selection of α and β
We assume in our scheme that on average a sensor node A has λ neighbors
and half of them will broadcast data packets to A at a certain communication
round. We also assume that among A’s λ/2 neighbors, v nodes can be
compromised by adversaries and each of them can send at most w bogus data
packets to A during that communication round. Note that all compromised
nodes must collude to send identical bogus data packages to A. Otherwise,
A will discard all cached data packets and report to the base station. To
make our scheme resilient against collusive attacks, the threshold β should
satisfy the following condition:
λ/2 ≥ β ≥ v.w + 1 (5)
After determining the threshold β, the delay α is chosen such that β data
packets can be received by the sensor node A. The delay α depends on the
transmit data rate and the radio backoff of the radio transceiver used on
sensor nodes. A radio backoff is a period of time where the radio pauses
before attempting to transmit. Two backoff periods are to be considered,
namely: initial backoff and congestion backoff. Taking into account all these
factors, we suggest that the delay α should satisfy the following condition:
α ≥ (SizeMAX/RateMAX + Init BackoffMAX
+ Cong BackoffMAX) ∗ β
(6)
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where, SizeMAX , RateMAX , Init BackoffMAX , and Cong BackoffMAX
are, respectively, the maximum allowable packet size, the maximum transmit
data rate, the maximum initial backoff, and the maximum congestion backoff.
We assume that there are on average N sensor nodes working on the
signature verification and PT is the probability that T sensor nodes will
release their intermediate computation results. Let Es, Er, and EMUL be
the energy consumption of sending and receiving one packet, and calculating
one elliptic curve scalar multiplication on sensor nodes, respectively. Recall
that we assume that each node has λ neighbors on average. Then, we can
roughly estimate the additional energy consumption/saving due to the use
of our fast signature verification technique as follows:
1. T sensor nodes will locally broadcast their intermediate computation
results, with energy consumption of T ∗ Es.
2. About λT/2 sensor nodes will receive the intermediate computation
results, with energy consumption of λT/2 ∗ Er.
3. About λT/2 sensor nodes will accelerate their signature verifications
using the received intermediate computation results, with energy saving
of λT/2 ∗ 2EMUL = λT ∗ EMUL.
Therefore, the expected additional energy consumption/saving will be:
N∑
T=1
PT (T ∗ Es + λT/2 ∗ Er − λT ∗ EMUL) (7)
6. Security Analysis
In what follow, the security strength of the proposed broadcast authen-
tication protocol is discussed:
6.1. Replay Attack
A replay attack is the retransmission of an outdated legitimate message
as a current message. Our scheme withstand this attack by the timestamp
information tt carried with broadcasted messages. However, it is important
to point out that the use of timestamp to prevent a replay attack must be
supported by a synchronization mechanism (e.g., [26, 27]) which requires
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itself to be kept secure [28]. As an alternative, random nonces can be used
instead of timestamps. A nonce is an unpredictable bit string, usually used
to achieve freshness.
6.2. User Revocation
User revocation can be achieved by simply broadcasting the identity of
revoked users by the base station. The revoked identities are placed into
the revocation list of nodes upon their reception. To reduce the risk of user
compromise due to hardware capture, we assume a password-based protec-
tion approach [9] to safeguard the private keys. The approach consists in
storing a private key calculated from the original private key and a hashed
password. The original private key will be recovered from the stored one only
when the correct password is provided. Indeed, finding (R, s) from (R′, s′)
without knowing the password is as hard as the ECDLP problem.
6.3. Sybil Attack
In Sybil attack [29], an attacker illegitimately claims multiple identities
in order to disrupt the behavior of network’s protocols and applications.
The ID-based cryptography mechanism relies on the existence of a trusted
authority, called a private key generator (PKG). We assume that the base
station is always reliable and can play the trusted authority role. Recall that
PKG generates a private key for each user’s identifier, and assigns the private
key to the user. The user can always sign on any message with private key,
and the generated signature can be verified with the user’s ID. In order to be
able to fake a user’s identity, the attacker has to fake a new private key which
is possible only by obtaining the system secret key x. Unless the secret key
x is stolen or the base station is attacked, the Sybil attack can be prevented.
6.4. Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is any event that diminishes or eliminates
a network’s capacity to perform its expected function [30]. Due to their in-
herent resource constraints, WSNs are especially vulnerable to DoS attacks
that aim to exhaust the network resources. DoS attack against the sensor
node storage is avoided by the immediate authentication of broadcast mes-
sages upon their reception using signature verification. Moreover, the forged
packets are dropped rather than being stored or forwarded to the next hop
which prevents both storage and bandwidth resource exhaustion. The energy
16
consumed by sensor nodes during the signature verification process is sub-
stantial even with acceleration. Therefore, an attacker can easily force nodes
in its vicinity to run out of the battery’s power by verifying the signature of
a large number of forged packets. However, this attack can be mitigated by
setting a threshold on the number of verification failure, after which a sensor
node will send a signed report to the base station. Once the base station re-
ceives enough reports from the network, it will perform appropriate security
mechanisms (outside the scope of this paper) to identify compromised nodes
in the network.
6.5. Scalability
The proposed broadcast authentication scheme achieves both sender and
receiver scalability based on vBNN-IBS. A user can dynamically join the
network by querying the base station for system parameters and a private
key corresponding to his/her identity. In addition, a large number of sensor
nodes can be supported, and new nodes can be added to the WSN after being
preloaded with system parameters.
7. Performance Evaluation
We analyzed the performance of the scheme in the ideal case (no adver-
sary) and in the 4× 4 grid-based WSN (See Figure 2).
7.1. Case Study and Evaluation Methodology
We propose a sensor network where each node only can directly commu-
nicate with its one-hop neighbors. A user sends its signed broadcast packet
to node 1 at Round 0. After six communication rounds, the broadcast packet
will be received and verified by all sensor nodes. Furthermore, in our sig-
nature verification scheme, we assume that one sensor node will release the
intermediate computation result l2R + l3P0 in each communication round
(the red nodes 1, 2, 6, 7, 11 and 12 on Figure 2).
The performance of the proposed scheme in terms of energy consump-
tion and diffusion latency was first evaluated through a theoretical analysis
assuming that MICAz motes are used. After that, The protocol was imple-
mented on TinyOS and evaluated through both simulation using Avrora [31]
and real-world experimentation using Crossbow MICAz motes. Note that
all simulation and experimentation results are averaged over 10 independent
runs with 95% confidence interval.
The performance evaluation was done in two stages:
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Figure 2: Broadcast Authentication in a 4× 4 grid-based WSN
First stage In which only the three dominant energy consuming operations,
involved in the signature verification procedure, were considered. These
operations are scalar point multiplication, message transmission, and
message reception. Here we assumed that the power consumption by
the remaining operations and node’s states is negligible.
Second stage In which all operations and node’s states are taken into con-
sideration. Thus, the performance evaluation is done over the entire
run of the experiment. Sensor nodes involved in the broadcast au-
thentication process are configured to operate in three different states,
namely: active, idle, and standby. In the active state, the node is either
transmitting, receiving, or processing a packet. The idle state keeps the
radio transceiver on, listening for authentication packets. While in the
standby state, the node is unable to transmit, receive, or process in-
formation. Note that nodes consume power not only in active state as
assumed in the first stage, but also when operating in idle or standby
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states. The power consumed in these two states increases over time.
Hence, more the authenticated diffusion takes time; more the energy
is consumed by the two states. The second stage let us see how the
acceleration approach can influence the impact of the idle and standby
power in the total power consumption.
The performance evaluation was conducted by setting up the following
diffusion scenario: initially a node is in the idle state until receiving authen-
tication packets. At that moment, the node moves to the active state. Once
the node finishes its authenticated diffusion, it goes into standby state until
the end of the authenticated broadcast in the entire network. The diffusion
scenario aims to show how the energy gain achieved by the accelerated ap-
proach is affected by the presence of a power-saving sleep mode (i.e. standby
state). Figure 3 illustrates the different states by which a node transit during
the diffusion.
Idle state Active state Standby state
Figure 3: The sensor node’s states during an authenticated diffusion
7.2. Theoretical Analysis
To give a detailed quantitative analysis, we assume that MICAz motes,
which work at 8 MHZ with a 8-bit processor ATmega128L, and which adopt
IEEE 802.15.4 standard, are used. The power level of a MICAz mote is
3.0V , the current draw in active mode is 8.0mA, the receiving current draw
is 19.7mA, the transmitting current draw is 17.4mA, and the data rate is
250kbps. An ATmega128L processor takes 0.81s to carry out a point multi-
plication over elliptic curve [32].
A vBNN-IBS signature comprises one point over E(Fq) and an integer
from Zp. To achieve the same security strength as 1024-bit RSA, the known
smallest reachable sizes of q and p are 168bits and 166bits, respectively [9].
Therefore, the message of form (4) is 139bytes, the resulted signature size is
83bytes, assuming M is 10bytes, ID is 2bytes, tt is 2bytes, and l2R+ l3P0 is
42bytes.
Based on the formula of calculating the energy consumption on MICAz
motes, we obtain the following basic facts:
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• A MICAz mote needs to transmit up to 128bytes in the physical layer.
Hence, to broadcast a packet of 139bytes, we need to transmit two
packets instead of only one transmitted in vBNN-IBS [9]. A MICAz
mote consumes Es = 3.0×17.4×8/250 = 1.67µJ and Er = 3.0×19.7×
8/250 = 1.89µJ to transmit and receive one byte respectively. So, the
additional information l2R + l3P0 requires to transmit one additional
packet which consumes Es = 3.0 × 17.4 × 128 × 8/250 = 0.214mJ
and Er = 3.0 × 19.4 × 128 × 8/250 = 0.466mJ to be transmitted and
received, respectively;
• The dominant operation to verify a vBNN-IBS signature is three point
multiplications, and the resulted computational energy consumption
of a sensor node is EMUL = 3.0 × 8.0 × 0.81 = 19.44mJ and Ever =
58.32mJ to compute a scalar elliptic curve multiplication and to verify
a vBNN-IBS signature, respectively.
In our scheme, some sensor nodes need to release their intermediate com-
putation results in order to accelerate the signature verification for their
neighboring nodes. Hence, our scheme consumes more energy for transmit-
ting the intermediate computation result l2R+ l3P0, when compared to using
the traditional vBNN-IBS signature verification in WSNs. In the 4× 4 grid-
based WSN, the six red nodes (i.e., Nodes 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12) will locally
broadcast their intermediate computation results to their one-hop neighbors,
which causes an extra energy consumption of 6 × 0.214 = 1.284mJ in the
network.
Note that although some sensor nodes (e.g., node 6) has four one-hop
neighbors, only two of them (i.e., nodes 7 and 10) will receive the intermediate
computation results since the other two (i.e., nodes 2 and 5) have finished
the signature verification in the previous round (i.e., Round 1) and gone into
the power-saving sleep mode. Therefore, there are totally 11 sensor nodes
receiving the intermediate computation results (2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,
15, 16), which causes an extra energy consumption of 11× 0.466 = 5.126mJ
in the WSN. In brief, our faster signature verification incurs an extra energy
consumption of 1.284 + 5.126 = 6.410mJ for transmitting (i.e., sending and
receiving) the intermediate computation results for the WSN in question.
At the same time, the signature verification on Nodes 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
11, 12, 15 and 16 will be accelerated by 66% (i.e., saving two elliptic curve
scalar multiplications) due to the use of the intermediate computation results
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from their neighboring nodes, which leads to a significant energy saving of
11 × 2 × 19.44mJ = 427.68mJ in the WSN, as compared to the traditional
vBNN-IBS signature verification technique.
To sum up, for the broadcast authentication in the target 4×4 grid-based
WSN, our faster signature verification can save the energy consumption of
427.68 − 6.410 = 421.27mJ in total, considering both the communication
and computation overheads. Therefore, using the accelerated vBNN-IBS
scheme, one can save up to 421.27mJ × 100/(16 × 58.32) = 45.15% energy
consumption for the grid-based WSN in question.
Following the same analysis procedure as above, we find that the ac-
celerated ECDSA scheme can achieve a theoretical energy gain of about
206.99mJ × 100/1244.16 = 16.64%.
7.3. Simulation Study
In this section, we will determine, by simulation, the achievable energy
gain by the accelerated approach when applied on the vBNN-IBS scheme.
The obtained results will be compared with those of the theoretical study.
7.3.1. First Stage
Recall that the CC2420 radio module is able to transmit up to 128bytes
per packet. As the size of a message of form (4) is 139bytes, two packets are
needed to be transmitted. To this end, we implemented two new 802.15.4
packet structures in TinyOS; one containing the user’s message and the gen-
erated signature, and the second containing the intermediate computation
result l2R + l3P0. Let SIG and INTER denote the two aforementioned
packets. The SIG and INTER packets are 98bytes and 56bytes, respec-
tively. To measure the energy consumed during the emission and reception
of the two packets, we programmed a NesC application for sending and re-
ceiving 802.15.4 packets. The application was run using two payload sizes
corresponding to the sizes of SIG and INTER. We found that SIG packet
consumes Es(SIG) = 491.4µJ and Er(SIG) = 598µJ to be transmitted
and received, respectively. In the other hand, we found that INTER packet
consumes Es(INTER) = 387, 1µJ and Er(INTER) = 467µJ for its trans-
mission and reception, respectively. Note that the obtained values reflect the
average of 10 independent runs for each payload size.
The scalar point multiplication can use several methods and optimization
techniques for its calculation [33]: The Affine Coordinate System (ACS), the
Projective Coordinate System (PCS), the Affine Coordinate System with
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Sliding Window (ACS with SW ), and the Projective Coordinate System
with Sliding Window (PCS with SW ). We tested and evaluated the execu-
tion time as well as the required memory for each method, in order to decide
which of them will be used in our implementation. When the sliding window
technique is used, the window size is fixed to w = 15. In fact, we chose
to perform two scalar point multiplications for each method: The selected
point is the generator G, while the 168bits scalar takes two possible values
(000 · · · 001) and (111 · · · 111). By doing so, we obtain a time interval allow-
ing us to estimate the average execution time of a scalar point multiplication.
The results are summarized in Table 1.
ACS PCS ACS with SW PCS with SW
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
(000 · · · 001) 21566 1619 21186 1482
(111 · · · 111) 41568 3217 26027 1882
Table 1: Execution time of a scalar point multiplication
We can clearly observe from Table 1 that the PCS with SW method is the
fastest. However, we have also taken care to evaluate the required memory
as demonstrated in Table 2. The results show that the fastest method is also
the most expensive in terms of RAM consumption.
ACS PCS ACS with SW PCS with SW
Required memory size 64 104 667 707
(Octets)
Table 2: Required memory for a scalar point multiplication
Given the limited size of MICAz sensor nodes’ memory, we decided to use
the PCS with SW method but reducing the sliding window size to w = 3. In
this way, the required memory will be reduced to 341octets. The execution
time of the scalar point multiplication becomes (See Table 3):
The obtained results show that using the PCS with SW method while
reducing the SW size from 15 to 3 leads to a scalar point multiplication
slowdown of about 16.4% but with a space saving of 51.71%. Hence, the
method ensures a satisfactory compromise between execution time and re-
quired memory size. From the simulation results, the average execution time
of a scalar point multiplication is estimated to be 1958ms.
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ACS with SW (ms) PCS with SW (ms)
(000 · · · 001) 21442 1558
(111 · · · 111) 31270 2358
Table 3: Execution time of a scalar point multiplication using SW with
w = 3
To measure the energy consumed by the calculation of an elliptic point
multiplication, we programmed a NesC application to calculate k consecutive
scalar point multiplications. The application was run by varying the value
of k from 5 to 20, and then the power consumed by one scalar point mul-
tiplication was estimated. The simulation results reflect the average of 10
executions for each value of k. We found that a scalar point multiplication
consumes 51.795mJ .
To sum up, the simulation study revealed that the emission of SIG (resp.
INTER) packet consumes 491, 4µJ (resp. 387.1µJ), its reception consumes
598µJ (resp. 467µJ), and that a scalar point multiplication takes an average
execution time of 1958ms and consumes 51.795mJ using a PCS with SW (w =
3) method.
Based on the obtained values, we conducted the same diffusion scenario
as in the theoretical study in order to estimate the energy gain achieved
by the acceleration approach when applied on both vBNN-IBS and ECDSA
schemes. Table 4 reports the total energy consumed by the different schemes
to perform an authenticated diffusion in the target 4× 4 grid-based WSN.
vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS ECDSA Acc. ECDSA
Energy (mJ) 2503 1371 3343.52 2783.3
Table 4: The total energy consumed by the network in the first stage (simu-
lation results)
Accelerated vs. traditional vBNN-IBS We found that the acceleration
approach allows the vBNN-IBS scheme to save up to 45.53% of the total
energy required for the broadcast authentication in the target 4 × 4
grid-based WSN. Recall that in the theoretical study, the accelerated
scheme allows a node to accelerate its signature verification by 66%
compared to the classical scheme. The simulation results show that
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the signature verification is achieved in 6699ms using the traditional
vBNN-IBS scheme and in 2228ms using the accelerated vBNN-IBS
scheme. Thus, we deduce that the accelerated scheme allows some
nodes to perform the signature verification 66.74% faster than in the
traditional scheme.
Accelerated vs traditional ECDSA We found that the acceleration ap-
proach allows saving up to 16.90% of the total energy, required by the
traditional ECDSA scheme. The simulation results show that the sig-
nature verification is achieved in 6863ms using the traditional ECDSA
scheme and in 4797ms using the accelerated ECDSA scheme.
Analysis We notice that the energy gains achieved by vBNN-IBS and ECDSA
in both theoretical and simulation studies differ slightly. This is mainly
due to the energy consumed by the multiplication operation, consid-
ered in the theoretical study to be 19.44mJ , given an execution time
of 0.81seconds. However, we demonstrated, by simulation, that the
execution time of such an operation is in average equal to 1958ms and
cannot go below 1400ms (with a SW of size 15). So, if we consider the
average execution time obtained by simulation in the theoretical study,
we will obtain a theoretical energy gain of 45.55% for vBNN-IBS and
16.97% for ECDSA. Now, the theoretical and simulation results become
fairly close.
The simulation study demonstrates that the impact of the accelera-
tion approach on the vBNN-IBS scheme is better than on the ECDSA
scheme. The obtained results showed an energy gain of 45.53% using
the accelerated vBNN-IBS scheme compared to only 16.90% when the
accelerated ECDSA scheme is applied. This difference can be explained
by the fact that in the ECDSA scheme, the acceleration is applied only
on the signature and not on the certificate. Moreover, the accelerated
vBNN-IBS scheme saves two elliptic curve scalar multiplications, while
the accelerated ECDSA scheme saves only one elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication.
7.3.2. Second Stage
In the complete simulation, all operations and node’s states are taken into
account; this is the simulation of the entire program. The aforementioned
diffusion scenario was performed using vBNN-IBS, ECDSA, and their accel-
erated versions. The energy consumed by each node was recorded, and then
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the total energy consumed within the network was computed. The diffusion
time was also recorded. Table 5 reports the obtained results. Note that the
results were averaged over 10 independent runs.
vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS ECDSA Acc. ECDSA
Energy (J) 42.79 27.26 43.46 36.49
Time (s) 50.30 25.17 53.87 39.60
Table 5: The total energy consumed by the network in the second stage
(simulation results)
According to Table 5, the simulation results show that the acceleration
approach speeds up the diffusion time by 49.96% in the case of vBNN-IBS
and by 26.49% in the case of ECDSA. As a result, the accelerated version of
vBNN-IBS (resp. ECDSA) is capable of saving up to 36.29% (resp. 16.04%)
of the total power required by its traditional version. Comparing these results
with those of the first stage, we can see that lower energy savings are gained
when the remaining operations and node’s states are taken into account. An
interesting observation is that the remaining operations and node’s states
constitutes a significant fraction (more than 92%) of the total energy dissi-
pated within the network. Therefore, neglecting this important fraction of
consumed energy has resulted in an over-estimated energy gain in the first
stage. Previous studies [34, 35, 36, 37] have demonstrated that the idle state
dominates the energy usage in WSNs. Even the standby mode tries to re-
duce energy wastage by turning off radio and putting CPU into sleep mode,
a node operating in this mode still consume energy. The power consumed in
idle and standby states increases over time. Thus, more the authenticated
diffusion takes time; more the energy will be drained.
To better assess the impact of both standby and idle states on perfor-
mance, the energy wasted by a node operating in these two states was deter-
mined. Table 6 presents the energy breakdown, by components, of a MICAz
node. We found that a node consumes an average of 66.49mJ/s when op-
erating in idle mode and 4.44mJ/s when operating in standby mode. The
results show that the energy consumption in the idle state is dominated by
the radio.
Using the energy values determined by the complete simulation, we esti-
mated the network lifetime as follow:
If we assume that nodes are powered by two AA batteries having a ca-
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CPU Radio Sensor board Flash Memory Total
Idle (mJ/s) 10.62 53.76 2.1 0.006 66.49
Standby (mJ/s) 2.33 0.0006 2.1 0.006 4.44
Table 6: Simulated energy breakdown of a MICAz mote operating in idle
and standby modes
pacity of 2450mAh, the considered 4 × 4 grid-based network will initially
have an energy equal to 16 ∗ ((2450 ∗ 3 ∗ 3600)/1000) = 423360J . During
experiments, we noticed that MICAz motes stop operating correctly when
their power source drops below 2.1V olt. In other words, when the power
source reaches 18522J , the node cannot function properly. Consequently, we
have considered that the network is exhausted when its energy reaches the
296352J .
In addition, we assume that an authenticated diffusion is performed once
every minute. At the beginning of each diffusion interval, all nodes wake-up
from standby state and move to idle state waiting for incoming authentication
packets, as shown in Figure 4:
Idle Active Standby Idle Active Standby ...
1mn 1mn
diffusion time diffusion time
Figure 4: The sensor node’s states when an authenticated diffusion is per-
formed once every minute
By knowing the duration of an authenticated diffusion (i.e. diffusion
time), the total energy spent to perform this diffusion within the network
as well as the energy wasted per second in standby state, the total energy
spent per minute can be deduced. For example, in the traditional vBNN-IBS
scheme, the network consumes 42.79Joule during 50.3s and 0.6896J during
the remaining 9.7s; thus, a total of 43.48J/mn. The total energy spent per
minute for vBNN-IBS, ECDSA, and their accelerated versions is reported in
Table 7.
Using the above results, the network lifetime according to the number
of authenticated diffusions performed, before the network is exhausted, is
depicted in Figure 5. The figure shows that the accelerated schemes extend
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vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS ECDSA Acc. ECDSA
Energy (J/mn) 43.48 29.66 43.89 37.93
Table 7: The total energy consumed by the network to perform one authen-
ticated diffusion per minute
more the network lifetime compared to their traditional versions. Further-
more, the accelerated vBNN-IBS scheme achieves the longest lifetime by
allowing for 4282 diffusions before the exhaustion of the network.
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Figure 5: Network lifetime vs. the number of authenticated diffusions
7.4. Experimental Study
In this section, we will show the achievable energy gain by the vBNN-IBS
and ECDSA schemes using the real-world experimentation. The obtained
results will be compared with those obtained by both the theoretical analysis
and simulation.
7.4.1. First Stage
We first determined the power draw for the signature verification, trans-
mission, as well as reception operations. The measurement setup is schemat-
ically depicted in Figure 6. It consists of a MICAz mote connected in series
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to a 10Ω resistor. The circuit is powered by two AA rechargeable batteries
with a supply voltage of 3V . Using a GDS−3352 digital storage oscilloscope,
the voltage drop over the resistor was measured and used to calculate the
current flow based on Ohm’s law. We found that the current draw when a
node is performing a signature verification is 27.6mA, the receiving current
draw is 25.53mA, and the transmitting current draw is 26.40mA.
MICAz mote
B
at
te
ry
Resistor (10Ω)
Oscilloscope
V
=
3
v
Figure 6: MICAz power collection setup
To compute the electrical energy consumed by a sensor node during t
seconds, we apply the Joule’s law as shown in equation 8.
E(Joule) = V(V olt) ∗ I(Ampere) ∗ t(seconds) (8)
Where E, V , and I are respectively the electrical energy, the supply
voltage, and the current intensity. The oscilloscope allowed us to determine
the time taken to transmit SIG, INTER, and CERTIF packets, and to
execute a scalar point multiplication. it took for the different algorithms to
execute. The measured times are presented in Table 8.
Based on the obtained values, we conducted the same diffusion scenario as
the in the theoretical and simulation studies in order to estimate the energy
gain achieved by the acceleration approach when applied on both vBNN-IBS
and ECDSA schemes. Table 9 summarizes the total energy consumed by the
different schemes to perform an authenticated diffusion in the target 4 × 4
grid-based WSN.
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time
Tx of SIG (ms) 3.552
Tx of INTER (ms) 2.208
Tx of CERTIF (ms) 3.232
Point multiplication (s) 1.95
Table 8: Duration of transmitting SIG, INTER, and CERTIF packets and
executing a scalar point multiplication (Experimental results)
vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS ECDSA Acc. ECDSA
Energy (J) 7.75 4.202 10.35 8.57
Table 9: The total energy consumed by the network in the first stage (ex-
perimental results)
Accelerated vs. traditional vBNN-IBS We found that the acceleration
approach allows the vBNN-IBS scheme to save up to 45.78% of the
total energy required for the broadcast authentication in the target
4 × 4 grid-based WSN. The experimental results show also that the
signature verification is achieved in 6.69s using the traditional vBNN-
IBS scheme and in 2.2s using the accelerated vBNN-IBS scheme. Thus,
we deduce that the accelerated scheme allows some nodes to perform
the signature verification 67.11% faster than in the traditional scheme.
Accelerated vs. traditional ECDSA We found that the acceleration ap-
proach allows saving up to 17.20% of the total energy, required by the
traditional ECDSA scheme. The experimental results show that the
signature verification is achieved in 6.869s using the traditional ECDSA
scheme and in 4.72ms using the accelerated ECDSA scheme. Thus, we
deduce that the accelerated scheme allows some nodes to perform the
signature verification 31.28% faster than in the traditional scheme.
Analysis The comparison of results presented in Tables 4 and 9 shows that
the total consumed energy measured by the real-world experimentation
is roughly 3 times bigger than that measured by simulation. This dif-
ference is mainly due to the current draw recorded during the signature
verification. The value measured by simulation was that of the CPU
component only, however the value found by the real-word experimen-
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tation was that of all mote’s components including the radio which was
turned on during the signature verification.
We notice that the experimental results in terms of energy gain are
consistent with both theoretical and simulation results. The experi-
mental results promote once again the application of the acceleration
approach on vBNN-IBS rather than ECDSA.
7.4.2. Second Stage
In this stage, the energy gain achieved by the execution of the entire
program was evaluated. We first determined the power draw for idle and
standby states. Using the afore-described measurement setup, we found that
the current draw of a MICAz mote in idle state is 22mA. Regarding the
standby state, the current draw was very low to be shown on the oscilloscope.
So, we used a Fluke 15B digital multimeter which reports a current draw of
2µA for a MICAz mote in standby mode.
After that, we performed a lab experiment where the behavior of each
mote were analyzed during the diffusion time. We distinguish two types
of behavior depending on whether the signature verification is accelerated
or not. The measurement setup described in the first stage was used to
measure the execution time of each operation (i.e. transmission, reception,
and signature verification) and state (i.e. idle and standby) for a given mote
during the diffusion time in the 4 × 4 grid-based network. Table 10 reports
the total execution time taken by the different operations and states in the
entire network (i.e. by the 16 motes).
Operation or mode vBNN-IBS (s) Acc. vBNN-IBS (s) ECDSA (s) Acc. ECDSA (s)
Standby mode 373.02 162.355 417.03 284.6
Idle mode 324.58 182.72 335.13 263.09
Emission 53.5 ∗ 10−3 48.76 ∗ 10−3 54.38 ∗ 10−3 75.68 ∗ 10−3
Reception 71.03 ∗ 10−3 95.31 ∗ 10−3 108.79 ∗ 10−3 147.8 ∗ 10−3
Signature verification 107.04 57.65 109.904 75.68
Table 10: The total execution time taken by each operation and state during
an authenticated diffusion in the target 4× 4 grid-based network
Knowing the current draw and the total execution time for a each op-
eration and state, the total energy consumed in the entire network can be
computed by applying the Joule’s law. The Table 11 summarizes the ob-
tained results.
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Operation or mode vBNN-IBS (J) Acc. vBNN-IBS (J) ECDSA (J) Acc. ECDSA (J)
Standby mode 2.238 ∗ 10−3 0.974 ∗ 10−3 2.502 ∗ 10−3 1.708 ∗ 10−3
Idle mode 21.42 12.06 22.12 17.36
Emission 2.813 ∗ 10−3 3.862 ∗ 10−3 4.307 ∗ 10−3 5.994 ∗ 10−3
Reception 5.44 ∗ 10−3 7.30 ∗ 10−3 8.332 ∗ 10−3 11.32 ∗ 10−3
Signature verification 8.863 4.773 9.100 7.124
Total 30.29 16.84 31.23 24.50
Table 11: The total energy consumed by the network in the second stage
(Experimental results)
The comparison of results presented in Tables 11 and 5 shows that the
total consumed energy measured by simulation is roughly 1.48 bigger than
that measured by the real-world experimentation. This difference is due to
several considerations: First, the startup and shutdown energy of the radio
as well as the energy wasted in transition between the different states were
not accounted in the total energy found by the experimental study. Second,
the standby current draw recorded by simulation was 1.48mA against 2µA
recorded by the real-world experimentation.
According to Table 11, the real-world experimentation results show an
energy gain of 44.40% (resp. 21.55%) when the acceleration approach is
applied on vBNN-IBS (resp. ECDSA). The experimental results promote
once again the application of the acceleration approach on vBNN-IBS rather
than ECDSA.
8. Impact of Network Topology on Performance
In this section, we investigate the impact that a network topology can
have on the performance of our scheme in terms of energy saving and diffusion
latency. In order to compare with the results obtained above, the network
size and the number of nodes selected to release the intermediate values are
kept the same as in the 4×4 grid-based topology. Two topologies are defined,
namely:
Circular topology in which the user is at the center of the topology and
the 16 sensor nodes are placed around the user as shown in Figure 7(a).
A user broadcasts its signed packet to nodes 6, 7, 10, and 10 at Round
0. After two other communication rounds according to the diffusion
pattern depicted in Figure 7(b), the broadcast packet will be received
and verified by all sensor nodes. We assume that nodes 2, 6, 7,10,
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11, and 12 are selected to release the intermediate computation result
l2R + l3P0 in order to accelerate the signature verification.
3D grid-based topology where the 16 nodes are placed on the vertexes
of three consecutive cubes as shown is Figure 8(a). A user broadcasts
its signed packet to nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 at Round 0. After three
other communication rounds following the diffusion pattern depicted
in Figure 8(b), the broadcast packet will be received and verified by
all sensor nodes in the network. Now, we assume that the six nodes
selected to release the intermediate result l2R+ l3P0 are nodes 1, 3, 6,
8, 10, and 12.
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Figure 7: The circular topology and the corresponding diffusion pattern
Comparing these topologies to the 4 × 4 grid-based topology, we can
draw the following observations: (1) The number of nodes accelerating their
signature verification decreases. While the 4×4 grid-based topology allows to
11 nodes to accelerate their signature verification, 10 nodes (i.e., nodes 1, 2, 3,
5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, and 16) are able to benefit from the acceleration process in
the circular topology and only 6 nodes (i.e., nodes 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 15) in
the case of 3D grid-based topology. (2) The number of communication rounds
decreases also. The diffusion in the entire network is made in 3 rounds with
the circular topology and 4 rounds with the 3D grid-based topology, instead
of 7 rounds in the case of 4× 4 grid-based topology.
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Figure 8: The 3D grid-based topology and the corresponding diffusion pat-
tern
These differences, either in number of nodes accelerating their signature
verification or number of communication rounds, will certainly impact both
the energy consumption and the diffusion time. To assess this impact, the
vBNN-IBS and its accelerated versions were simulated on both topologies
using Avrora [31] and considering the two stages; that is, the first stage
where only the three dominant energy consuming operations are considered
and the second stage where all operations and node’s states are taken into
consideration. Furthermore, the same diffusion scenario as the one described
in Section 7.1 is used.
8.1. Scheme’s Performance under Circular Topology
In the first stage, we found that vBNN-IBS consumes a total energy of
2506.41mJ while the accelerated version consumes 1477.5mJ , leading to save
up to 41% of the total energy required for the broadcast authentication in the
entire network. The accelerated scheme still allows some nodes to perform
the signature verification 66.74% faster than in the traditional scheme.
In the second stage, where all operations and node’s states are taken into
account, the entire program was simulated and the total energy consumed
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within the network as well as the diffusion time were recorded. Table 12
reports the obtained results.
vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS
Energy (J) 23.48 20.9
Time (s) 25.36 20.96
Table 12: The total energy consumed by the network in the second stage
when the circular topology is used
According to Table 12, the results show that the acceleration approach
speeds up the total diffusion time by 17.33% and saves up to 11% of the
total power required by its traditional version. We notice that the energy
gain is lower than the one achieved in the first stage. As explained above,
this difference is mainly due to the energy consumed by the idle and standby
states which represents more than 92% of the total energy dissipated within
the network. Indeed, the diffusion is made in only three rounds and all nodes
in the second level accelerate their signature verification. Thus, the energy
gain is dominated by the time passed by the leaf nodes (i.e., nodes 1, 4,
13, and 16) in the idle mode which is reduced by only 4s in the accelerated
version. However, it should be noted that the circular topology reduced the
total diffusion time by 16.73% and the energy gain by 23.33% compared to
the 4× 4 grid-based topology when the acceleration approach is applied.
8.2. Scheme’s Performance under 3D grid-based Topology
In the first stage, we found that vBNN-IBS consumes a total energy of
2501.62mJ while the accelerated version consumes 1885.2mJ , leading to save
up to 24.64% of the total energy required for the broadcast authentication
in the entire network. We notice that a lower energy gain is achieved com-
pared to the two other topologies. In fact, this is due to the number of nodes
accelerating their signature verification which is equal to 6 nodes only. How-
ever, the accelerated scheme still allows some nodes to perform the signature
verification 66.74% faster than in the traditional scheme.
In the second stage, the results showed in Table 13 were obtained.
The results in Table 13 show that the acceleration approach speeds up the
total diffusion time by only 5.8%. Indeed, the nodes placed on the left upper
vertices (i.e., 2, 5, 9, and 16) and those placed on the right lower vertices (i.e,
4,7,11, and 14) have to operate a classical signature verification regardless if
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vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS
Energy (J) 28.9 27.3
Time (s) 31.36 29.54
Table 13: The total energy consumed by the network in the second stage
when the 3D grid-based topology is used
the acceleration approach is used or not. In other words, the total diffusion
time will be almost the same apart from the execution time of the code on
each node. The results show also that the acceleration approach saves up
to 5.54% of the total power required by its traditional version. We notice
that the diffusion time energy gain is lower than the one achieved in the first
stage which is mainly due to the energy consumed by the idle and standby
states. As the diffusion time is almost the same and the number of nodes
accelerating their signature verification is only 6, the acceleration approach
will have a little impact on reducing the amount of energy wasted on idle
and standby modes.
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Figure 9: The new diffusion pattern under the 3D grid-based topology
It is clear that the diffusion pattern affects the way energy is wasted in the
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network and consequently the achieved performance. To assess this impact,
the second stage simulation of the proposed scheme under the 3D grid-based
topology was redone, this time following the diffusion pattern depicted in
Figure 9. The new diffusion pattern allows to twelve nodes (i.e., 2, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15) to accelerate their signature verification. We
assume that the user through the base station is able to communicate only
with node 1. The total diffusion time and the total energy consumed in the
entire network are shown in Table 14.
vBNN-IBS Acc. vBNN-IBS
Energy (J) 36.8 28.77
Time (s) 44.83 27.54
Table 14: The total energy consumed by the network in the second stage
when the 3D grid-based topology is used and the diffusion pattern in Figure 9
is followed
The results in Table 14 demonstrate that the acceleration approach speeds
up the total diffusion time by up to 38.57% and saves up 21.82% of the total
power required by its traditional version. Compared to the previous diffusion
pattern, the new one reduced the total diffusion time by almost 7%.
From the above results, it is easy to show that the performance is not only af-
fected by the number of nodes releasing intermediate results, but also by the
deployment topology of nodes and the diffusion pattern followed to broadcast
the user packet in the entire network.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented an accelerated verification of vBNN-IBS, a pairing-
free identity-based signature with reduced signature size. The acceleration
technique aims to reduce the energy consumption and thus extend the net-
work lifetime by decreasing the computation overhead due to signature ver-
ification. The proposed technique exploits the cooperation among nodes to
speed up the signature verification of nodes receiving a partially-calculated
signature which leads to lower energy consumption during the verification
process. The performance of the proposed scheme in terms of energy con-
sumption and diffusion latency was evaluated through a theoretical analysis,
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simulation, and real-world experimentation using a MICAz platform. The
obtained results showed that the acceleration technique allows an average
energy gain during the verification phase of around 45% when applied on
vBNN-IBS signatures against only 16% when applied on ECDSA signatures.
The conducted evaluation studies demonstrated that the acceleration ap-
proach reduces the idle energy by speeding up the total diffusion time in the
network. In a 4×4 grid-based network, the accelerated vBNN-IBS speeds up
the total diffusion time by 49.96% allowing an overall energy gain of about
36% and then a longer network lifetime. Moreover, the total energy cost of
the accelerated vBNN-IBS is reduced by more than 25% compared to the ac-
celerated ECDSA scheme which promotes the application of the acceleration
approach on ID-based signature schemes.
A performance evaluation under collusive attacks forms the basis of our
current work. A future work consists in devising a load-balanced technique
to share the burden of releasing intermediate results among all nodes and in
finding the adequate diffusion pattern to achieve higher energy saving.
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